Imagine a political rally—on one side, a far-left group demands sweeping economic reforms and decries corporate greed. On the other side, a far-right group denounces global elites and calls for the protection of local industries. Their rhetoric seems worlds apart, yet their demands share a striking resemblance. Could it be that ideological extremes aren’t so different after all?
The idea that “most Americans just want the same thing” is compelling but often oversimplified. This creates categories of “mainstream Americans,” who may have small disagreements in policy or approach but are still trying to achieve the same ends, and “fringe” Americans, who are well outside the Overton window. But what if the fringes are also trying to achieve those same ends and are even suggesting similar policies to reach them? Clearly, the far left and far right are not identical. Ideological distinctions exist for a reason, serving as a differentiator between two very different philosophies: liberalism and conservatism. However, while their ideological orientations are radically different, the actual policies proposed by the extreme ends of both sides are often surprisingly aligned in their populist undertones. This is especially evident in economics and foreign policy, where both sides frequently critique globalism and corporate power.
With respect to economics, the far left and far right have become surprisingly similar. The furthest right wing of the Republican Party, once defined by libertarian conservatism, has now been replaced by populist conservatism or “common good” conservatism. This branch of conservatism, arguably flirting with authoritarianism, holds that the same regulations Republicans apply to cultural and social issues should also be applied to economics in the interest of promoting a moral society. This logic mirrors that of left-wing economists and politicians, who argue that the government must ensure a more equitable society through economic intervention.
While the far left and far right agree that economic populism should drive public policy, they differ on where the government should intervene. This is where the “merging” of both sides is halted by ideological distinctions. Most right-wing economic populism intersects with nationalism. Unlike traditional libertarian conservatives, right-wing populists believe the government should intervene to improve life for working-class Americans—albeit at the expense of foreign workers. For example, Republicans often advocate for immigration restrictions to artificially increase the price of labor in the United States or impose tariffs on foreign goods to incentivize buying American-made products. These populist policies, however, often fail to penalize the wealthy and upper class in the same way left-wing policies do.
In contrast, left-wing economic populism aims to help poor and middle-class American workers at the expense of the wealthy. Leftists advocate for raising taxes on the rich to fund welfare programs or passing labor regulations that require companies to pay overtime, which eats directly into corporate profits. In brief, the far right seeks to uplift the middle class by prioritizing American labor, while the far left seeks to do so through the redistribution of capital. Yet both sides believe the government should legislate specifically to benefit lower-class Americans. The horseshoe certainly exists—it just doesn’t come full circle.
Foreign policy provides another example where horseshoe theory applies. Both the far left and far right are isolationist and oppose American military intervention. However, while their proposed policies align, their reasoning differs. Once again, right-wing policy emerges from the idea that helping one group—American citizens—must come at the expense of another. In a supposedly populist attempt to aid Americans, the far right advocates eliminating all U.S. spending overseas, redirecting those resources domestically.
The far left also supports drastically reducing U.S. spending abroad, especially on the military. However, their justification centers on the harm caused by American intervention. The left often claims that the United States spreads destruction globally and that both America and the world would benefit from a non-interventionist approach.
Interestingly, this argument occasionally appears on the far right as well. Tucker Carlson, for example, recently criticized the use of nuclear weapons in World War II, referencing the Japanese civilian death toll—an argument virtually identical to left-wing critiques of the bomb. Similarly, Candace Owens recently called Israel’s war in Gaza a “genocide,” opposing U.S. military aid to Israel due to the civilian casualties in Gaza. While mainstream Republicans and Democrats would hesitate to use such terms, many on the far left and far right agree in condemning interventions like these.
Overall, economic populism and foreign policy isolationism demonstrate how the ideological horseshoe bends, bringing the far left and far right closer together despite their differing motivations. Like the rally described at the start, these extremes often echo each other in their critiques of corporate power, globalism, and intervention. The fringes, it seems, may not be as far apart as they appear.
